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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1679 
___________ 
 
JASON SPEARS, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PASQUALE LEPORACE; CITY OF READING 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-05749) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 21, 2011 
 
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 3, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jason Spears filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a 
Reading police officer, Pasquale Leporace, unlawfully seized and searched him in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment (which led to the discovery of a gun and to his 
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arrest).  In addition to Leporace, Spears initially sued the Reading Police Department, but 
the District Court permitted him to amend the complaint to name the City of Reading as a 
defendant instead.  The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the 
District Court granted.  The District Court concluded that Leporace was entitled to 
qualified immunity for his actions and that the City of Reading could not be held liable 
on the theory of liability that Spears advanced.  Spears appeals.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  
Abramson v. William Patterson College, 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 First, we note that it is not entirely clear if Spears challenges the District Court’s 
disposition of the claim against the City of Reading.  However, to the extent he does 
challenge it, as the District Court explained, Spears did not present the evidentiary 
support necessary to sustain his claim of liability.  See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978); Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 155-
57 (3d Cir. 2007).  Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of the City of Reading.      
 The District Court also properly concluded that Leporace was entitled to summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds.  Qualified immunity shields government 
officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  The inquiry into the 
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applicability of qualified immunity has two parts: (1) whether the plaintiff demonstrated 
the deprivation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was established at the 
time of the alleged deprivation.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) 
(citing the test set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).  The circumstances 
in any particular case determine which part of the test is addressed first.  See id. at 236.  
The standard allows “ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”  Kelly v. Borough of 
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted).  However, 
an immunity defense ordinarily fails where the law is clearly established, because “a 
reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.”  Id. 
(citation and quotation omitted).   
 The right at issue is the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Searches and seizures must be justified 
at their inception, and their scope must be reasonably related to the circumstances that 
justified the interference initially.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).  A police 
officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop and a reasonable search for weapons for his 
own protection “where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and 
dangerous individual.”  Id. at 27.  The “issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in 
danger.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Due weight is accorded to specific reasonable 
inferences that stem from the facts in light of an officer’s experience, but not to a mere 
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“hunch.”  Id.  Essentially, under the whole circumstances, the officer “must have a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
activity.”  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see also United States v. 
Brown, 159 F.3d 147, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (summarizing the test for reasonable suspicion).   
 Factors that support reasonable suspicion include the presence of a suspect in a 
high crime area, behavior that is nervous or evasive, and “behavior that conforms to 
police officers’ specialized knowledge of criminal activity.”  United States v. Torres, 534 
F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation omitted); see also United States v. 
Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 561 (3d Cir. 2006) (listing also the time of day, or, more 
specifically, a late hour, particularly in a high crime area, as a factor).  An officer can act 
reasonably in stopping a man whose acts, when viewed in isolation, were entirely legal, 
as long as the acts, taken in combination with other circumstances, give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 207-
08 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 In this case, the defendants pointed to specific facts that supported reasonable 
suspicion.  They produced evidence that Leporace arrived (with other officers from the 
vice division of the Reading Police Department) around 11:00 p.m. to investigate 
complaints of drug dealing at a bar called Travelers Pub.  The bar is in a high-crime area
1
 
                                              
1As the District Court noted, Spears objected to the characterization of the bar’s location 
as “high-crime,” contending there was no evidence in the record to support this 
description.  However, Leporace’s affidavit, in which he describes the area and the 
complaints by police, patrons, and bar employees, served as the source of evidence in the 
5 
 
and had been the subject of many similar complaints.  Leporace, based on his 17 years of 
experience on the police force (12 of them in the vice division), knew that guns are often 
present where there is drug dealing.  He also knew that individuals who carry guns often 
conceal them in their waistbands, perform “security checks” of their weapons to be sure 
the weapon is in place, and wear heavy clothes to hide the outline of a firearm.  
 When Leporace entered the bar, he saw Spears, wearing a heavy winter coat while 
sitting at a table indoors, look at the officers, arch his back, adjust something in his 
waistband, and quickly put his left hand inside his left coat pocket.  The defendants 
submitted evidence that  Leporace “believed [it] was a handgun in his waistband,” 
providing Leporace’s affidavit that he thought Spears was armed, citing the police report 
with the statement that “[Spears] appeared the [sic] adjust an unknown item in his 
waistband (similar to a handgun) and then quickly place his left hand in his left jacket 
pocket”; and submitting Leporace’s pre-trial testimony that he saw Spears arch his back 
and adjust something in his waistband.
2
   
 Furthermore, when Leporace approached Spears and asked him if he had a gun in 
his waistband, Spears seemed to be extremely nervous and did not look Leporace in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
record, and Spears did not present any evidence to counter it.  On appeal, Spears contends 
that statements in his response to the motion for summary judgment should have been 
considered evidence that controverted the description of the area as “high-crime.”  
However, he did not state that the area was not a high-crime area or dispute the police 
calls to the bar.  He just described the area as “not inner city” but “suburban.”   
 
2
 The Appellees have collected the transcript of this testimony and other relevant portions 
of the District Court record in a supplemental appendix that they seek to file.  We grant 
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eye, looking instead toward the exit.  He hesitated before answering.  Leporace then 
conducted a pat-down search of Spears’s left coat pocket, where he felt three cell phones.  
Leporace, in his experience in the vice division, has noted that persons who sell drugs 
often carry multiple cell phones.  Leporace had Spears stand up from where he was 
sitting and patted him down again.  Spears shrugged off his coat as he stood up; another 
officer searched it and found a gun with obliterated serial numbers.    
 Based on the evidence described above that supported reasonable suspicion, we 
agree with the District Court that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue 
whether a reasonable officer would have believed that his conduct was lawful.   
Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of Leporace on qualified 
immunity grounds was proper.   
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  As we noted 
above, the Appellees’ motion to file the supplemental  appendix attached to their brief is 
granted.    
                                                                                                                                                  
their request.       
